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Abstract
This article explores the ethics review committee as a contemporary witness to 
the conduct of biomedical research. Ethics committee work is an internationally 
growing form of deliberation and decision making, a technology of anticipation that 
grants researchers access to experimental spaces, research funds and publication 
venues. Drawing on ethnographic work with a range of ethics committees across 
the Asia-Pacific region, I explore the metaphorical extension of logics of seeing into 
bureaucratic forms of ethics review. My analysis untethers the witnessing voice from 
an individual ‘point of view’, focusing on the attestive assemblage and its documen-
tation. By exploring the committee as a form of collective attestation, I aim to show 
witnessing as a form of ethical work, for ethical ends.
Keywords: attesting, bureaucracy, committee, ethics, vision, witnessing
Introduction
On the second day of the 2010 Forum of Ethics Review Committees of Asia and 
the Western Pacific Conference in Shanghai, Dr Dipika took to the stage for her 
panel on continuing review practices. A microbiologist working at a research hos-
pital in Mumbai, she stood to face the annual gathering on behalf of the research 
ethics committee she had served on for a number of years. Looking out across 
the hundreds of other committee members, she was sombre. Her talk described 
the death of a participant in an antibiotics study, an event which had prompted 
her committee to reassess its existing practices for following up on the research 
proposals that crossed their desk. In addition to reporting the participant’s death 
as a Serious Adverse Event, as most committees in the room would have done, her 
committee had decided to make an effort to confirm the causality. When they did, 
Dr Dipika said, they found anomalies in the paperwork at the site. This, coupled 
with her committee’s newly developed Standard Operating Procedures for visiting 
research sites, led to the instigation of regular checks on trials running under the 
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committee’s jurisdiction. From now on, she told the gathered conference-goers, if 
ethics approval was given to a study, members of the committee would be assigned 
to undertake a ‘monitoring site visit’, speak to staff and patients, and observe the 
site and the informed consent process. Comprehensive in its scope and designed to 
fulfil new requirements of the Indian Council on Medical Research, they hoped to 
keep better track of studies. As Dr Dipika spoke about the scheme, her voice became 
louder, faster and more agitated, the concern in it growing. She listed problem after 
problem that her monitoring team from the ethics committee had encountered 
during their visit, and for those gathered at the conference the list was startling. 
The protocol being used was not the same as the one approved by the committee. 
The informed consent sheet in use was not the one which had incorporated the 
committee’s requested amendments. In addition to the participant death, there were 
further Serious Adverse Events that the principal investigator had not reported to 
the ethics committee. Patients’ signatures were missing from the informed consent 
document. ‘How can we rely on this data if the signature is missing?’ Dr Dipika 
asked her audience. Worse, English-speaking patients had been given Hindi in-
formed consent documents, using a translation that had not been approved by the 
ethics committee. ‘I don’t know what the integrity of the data is,’ she repeated. 
The discussion following her presentation erupted. Rather than expressing 
concern for the findings of the monitoring study, as Dr Dipika had perhaps ex-
pected, delegates took issue with the right and capacity of the ethics committee to 
do ‘monitoring’ at all. Several congratulated her on her committee’s commitment 
to following up on their studies, but noted this was not a requirement of the World 
Health Organization’s guidelines. ‘It’s not going to be easy for other ethics commit-
tees to do this,’ noted one, ‘because it’s very intensive and requires expertise.’ Others 
agreed, citing expense: ‘I don’t think even 1 per cent of the people in this room can 
do that’. Speakers worried about adding yet more tasks to the ethics committee, a 
body populated largely by volunteers. A delegate who had spent a good part of her 
career training clinical monitors to visit and assess the operation of clinical trials 
argued that it was already hard enough, ‘difficult it is, to already just sit there as a 
member of EC [ethics committee] to do the job they’re supposed to be doing well’. 
To add another task to the committee, the details of visiting the site and ‘doing a 
good audit’, she said, was simply a different area of expertise.1 
Dr Dipika’s desire to go and see the site where research was taking place is 
immediately understandable. Like Dr Dipika, ethnographers want to see for them-
selves, to hear and observe. As the editors of this special issue point out, witnessing 
is a matter of public concern, and affective power. Where reference to it is present, 
questions arise about who may witness, what qualities they must have, for whom 
they see, and the technologies their witnessing makes use of. But ethics review is an 
anticipatory exercise, taking place in advance of the research itself. While commit-
tee members regularly wonder what becomes of studies that pass over their tables, 
Dr Dipika’s innovation is not just an example of a committee reaching beyond its 
initial mandate of reviewing a protocol. It is also not just a case of a very literal 
interpretation of the principle of ‘continuing review’. It reveals a belief that going 
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to see, to personally experience a setting, offers greater contact with the world of 
research and what is happening in it. 
In this article, I tie together this idea of witnessing, the in-person experience 
that Dr Dipika sought, with the institution of the ethics committee as a global 
form of (anticipatory) decision making on biomedical research. Despite the obvious 
appeal of monitoring activities, my argument does not emerge from the experiential 
logics she invoked by visiting the sites where research was taking place. Instead, 
I am interested in the logics that make up the work of seeing a research proposal, 
and providing ethics approval before research itself happens. I argue that the logics 
of an ethics committee are rooted in visual cultures, and that through its form, 
composition and actions, the committee relies on spatial and temporal forms that 
underpin its capacity to speak. To explore the work of ethics committees through 
the lens of witnessing allows us to perceive how bureaucratic forms encode ideals 
of proximity and distance, forcing us to examine the location, history and practices 
of this social body. As the editors argue, to foreground the structural, relational, 
material and performative dimensions of witnessing (Chua and Grinberg, this 
issue) means looking into sites where witnessing may be more diffuse, contested, 
(re)mediated or, indeed, tacit. At the heart of my analysis is a story that metaphor-
ically extends specific, informed and authoritative ways of seeing into bureaucratic 
forms of ethics review. Through this extension, I argue, emerges a committee that 
can do the work of witnessing research yet to come. 
For the past ten years, I have studied the work of the regional NGO who hosted 
the conference at which Dr Dipika spoke that autumn in 2010. Their mission, now 
as then, is to develop capacity in ethical review through training up (primarily 
biomedical) research ethics committees, who are based either in universities or in 
research hospitals. The NGO, the Forum of Ethics Review Committees of Asia and 
the Western Pacific (or FERCAP hereafter), was set up in 2000 with the specific 
purpose of generating the skills and abilities within institutions to conduct ethics 
review. Funded through initial grants from the World Health Organization’s Tropi-
cal Disease Research arm and support from the US Seattle-based PATH, which 
until 2014 stood for the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health, the NGO 
today has twenty years of experience running local training workshops in how 
ethics committee work operates. Its growing network of members have supported 
one another across the Asia-Pacific region as they work to set up and improve the 
operations of their own committees. As such, my fieldwork has taken place in what 
George Marcus calls a post-Cold War ‘regime of intervention’ (2005: 32), where 
this NGO seeks to intervene in global inequalities of review capacity (Douglas- 
Jones 2017). This intervention originates in the leadership of two women from the 
Philippines and Thailand, operating with and through global networks of their 
own construction. Their objective has been not only to support research happen-
ing in the ‘South’, but also to ensure that research collaborations that take place 
between the well-resourced and funded researchers in Europe and North America 
are met with informed and critical counterparts in lower-income settings. Since 
the  majority of biomedical research (and all involving human subjects) cannot go 
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ahead without ethical approval, something only an ethics committee can provide, 
I have followed the kinds of activities going on to ensure access to these research 
worlds. I participated in training and surveying teams, from Sri Lanka to Thailand, 
on to the Philippines, Taiwan and Mainland China, and it is from this multi-sited 
material that I have come to see committees as doing the work of witnessing ‘good’ 
science, through their form, content and voice. 
Over the years, my analysis has developed into a consideration of the ethics 
committee – known in the United States primarily as an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) – as a global decision-making form, concretely (if varyingly) described in 
documents, policies and regulations, enacted through meetings. The histories of 
how committees are integrated into research and clinical practice are national, but 
their role in placing ethics at the gateway to the making of ‘good science’ is interna-
tional. Committees are now obligatory points of passage for all research with what 
in the United States is termed ‘human subjects’, at home in the audit cultures and 
virtuous bureaucracies of the late twentieth century (Jacob and Riles 2008; Strathern 
2000). I conceptualize the work of committees through the analytic of witnessing by 
placing their practices in a longer history of witnessing within scientific research. 
Historian of science Steve Shapin, in his writings about polymath Robert Boyle’s 
early experiments with an air pump, describes in detail the work – material, polit-
ical and social – that went into generating scientific methodology. Boyle insisted 
that the witnessing of experimental work was ‘to be a collective enterprise … the 
reliability of testimony depend[ing] crucially upon its multiplicity’ (Shapin 1994: 
488), and the written word became a crucial element in communicating witnessed 
experimentation. Taking up this story, Donna Haraway deals critically with the 
witnesses Shapin identifies as so central to the seventeenth-century project of 
emergent scientific method, showing how features of trustworthiness – the modest 
witnesses – resided in gendered norms that continue to shape knowledge making: 
whose accounts can ‘lose all trace of their history as stories, as products of parti-
san projects, as contestable representations, or as constructed documents in their 
potent capacity to define the facts’ (Haraway 1997: 24)? Just as it mattered who 
assembled to attest to the making of a scientific fact (Haraway 1997), I explore how 
it matters who is assembled to assess research proposals before they are put into 
practice. As we shall see, the job demands skilled expertise, an expertise willing to 
make itself subsequently constitutive yet unidentifiable in a committee decision.
Now, witnessing is not a term that committee members I worked with use to 
talk about their activities. Witnessing can, doubtless, be an ethical moment or 
life project. Indeed, the political theorist Michal Givoni argues in her work that 
witnessing has undergone a transformation from domains of legality and faith to 
become a ‘social vocation in its own right’ (Givoni 2014, 2016). Many who serve 
on biomedical research ethics committees do consider their task through a broader 
lens of justice: improved health outcomes, better treatments, and more cures for 
people they will never meet. The kind of research they wish to make possible, from 
global cancer trials to neglected and tropical disease studies, comes with an often 
tacit yet inter-generational logic of continuous improvement in human wellbeing. 
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So while we could think about witnessing as a form of ethics (e.g. van Dooren on 
witnessing as ethics [2004] or Bird Rose on becoming-witness [2015]), my argu-
ment focuses more specifically on ethics – in its bureaucratic instantiation – as a 
form of witnessing.
In illuminating everyday committee practice, I draw on ethnographies of 
another international NGO, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Fassin 2008;  Redfield 
2006).Peter Redfield and Didier Fassin’s analyses of the witnessing work and ethos 
of MSF share with my fieldwork a valorisation of the distant, professionalized 
viewer, one for whom an idea of objectivity hovers. However, as I go on to show, 
there are important and interesting departures. My argument proceeds in four 
parts. I am interested first in how the collective vision of the committee devel-
ops. Research ethics, while practised in scientific domains, does not have clear-cut 
answers. Yet answers must be arrived at. As I will argue, there is translation of ideals 
of vision into the bureaucracies of ethics committee practice, which tie its operation 
to scientific histories of bearing witness. Second, I put together witnessing and 
secrecy. As the sociologist Laura Stark has pointed out from her work with ethics 
committees in the United States, few are open to observation (Stark 2012). Few 
members share publicly their committee experiences, and the testimony as a mode 
of witnessing their work is rare. This raises questions for the kind of assessment 
that takes place. Third, I explore how voices that will not abide by the conditions 
of collective voice and closed decision can result in what one interviewee called 
‘martyrs of the committee’. What does it mean in this setting to trace an alternate 
etymological route of witness into the terrain of martyrdom? Finally, arriving at the 
committee’s approval letter as the eventual product of their assessment, I develop 
an analysis of committee work as attestation. I differentiate witnessing and attesting 
to discuss the double meaning of making ‘good’ science. In each section, I draw 
out a different facet of the committee as witness, with the committee constituting a 
technology that reveals ethics committee work as a specific mode of witnessing. My 
aim in assembling these facets is to sketch an understanding of how a committee 
– a group of people sitting around a table – comes to speak as one; to illustrate the 
kinds of imaginaries of representational politics that are embedded within the form 
of the committee; and to illustrate how these are continuous with regimes that tie 
together vision and knowledge in the making of legitimate decisions.
Where do research ethics committees come from?
Ethics committee work is an internationally growing form of decision making, a 
technology of anticipation that grants access to experimental spaces, research funds 
and publication venues. While medical ethics has long histories in a vast array of 
healing traditions, the making of documents concerned with experimental research 
has a history spanning the last decades of the twentieth century, and is just beginning 
to be written. In North America, ethics committees were part of a discourse about re-
storing ‘trust’ and participation in research following research scandals (Stark 2012). 
In the United Kingdom, the social historian Duncan Wilson’s work has examined 
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shifting power relations and expertise in the workings of medicine through the emer-
gence of bioethics during the era of audit cultures (2014). Most importantly for my 
purposes here, research itself was also undergoing international changes. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, research efforts became increasingly global in their reach 
and collaborative scope. Pre-existing concerns about the testing of new substances 
on the research bodies of ‘elsewhere’ intensified, raising questions of variable ethics 
(Petryna 2005, 2009). In a biomedical context, research is itself taken to be a response 
to human suffering: it is a given within the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical 
Association [1964] 2013) that research on humans is a necessary condition for the 
development of drugs to alleviate that suffering. But these interventions on human 
bodies – healthy and sick – have, throughout the twentieth century, also been sites 
where what will be acceptable forms of research are negotiated. 
International documents agree that committees local to the research are impor-
tant, and should exist. In the early 2000s, this was called ‘dual ended’ review, with 
the UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2002, paragraph 8.22) recommending that 
all research should be reviewed in both the sponsoring country and the countries 
where the research will take place (‘hosts’). During the first few years of my study of 
ethics committees outside of Europe and America, the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) put the demand for ‘local’ ethics review committees most strongly in their 
2012 report:
A clinical trial should not take place in a country in the absence of a review by an 
Ethics Committee in that country. If such a committee does not exist it should be 
established as a pre-requisite before the trial takes place. (EMA 2012: 17)
The presence and role of committees is an ongoing topic within revisions to in-
ternational guidelines (CIOMS 2016). In their 2018 Global Code of Conduct, the 
European Commission coined the concept of ‘ethics dumping’, which they used to 
point to the risks occurring when ‘research with sensitive ethical issues is conducted 
by European organisations outside the EU in a way that would not be accepted in 
Europe from an ethical point of view’ (EC 2018). The term ‘ethics dumping’ devel-
oped as a way of giving name to inequalities of power in research collaborations, 
namely that research unacceptable in the country of the researcher (or funder) 
might be taken elsewhere in the world to be conducted (Nordling 2018). 
But what is an ethics committee actually evaluating? There is widespread agree-
ment that if research is not scientific – if it will not produce scientifically valid 
findings – then it is inherently unethical. Ethics assessments and scientific assess-
ments are intertwined at a basic level. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics pointed 
to this challenge when they followed up on their 2002 report. Participants in the 
discussions agreed that both a proposal’s scientific quality and ethical issues should 
be reviewed, but, as they reported, ‘there was disagreement as to how this should be 
achieved. Ideally, and where feasible, it was suggested that these review processes 
should be separated’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2005: 48). Desirable though the 
separation may be, it is not always ‘feasible’. Ethics review has been differently insti-
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tutionalized, with some committees receiving only protocols that have gone through 
a scientific review, and others not. Nuffield participants noted that in a small country 
such as Fiji, ‘there are not currently enough suitably qualified experts to make it 
possible to create two separate committees’ (Nuffield Discussion Paper 2005: 48). 
The discussion paper concluded that an ethics committee had a ‘duty’ to ensure 
that both the scientific and ethical aspects of a proposal were reviewed, ‘rather than 
stating how this should be achieved’ (Nuffield Discussion Paper 2005: 48). 
In this way, ethics committees come into a more familiar history of science: 
in bearing witness to the scientific validity of the protocols on their table, they are 
not bearing witness to the making of a fact but to what can be sought as knowl-
edge. This has not gone unnoticed by scholars, causing complaints of censorship 
(Hamburger 2004), and, in Stark’s memorable phrase, ethics committees ‘are con-
sequential because they affect how researchers go about creating knowledge – and, 
as a result, the kinds of things that are knowable’ (2011: 234, emphasis added). 
Ethics committees’ attention to matters considered scientific can frustrate: ‘clinical 
researchers’, wrote neurologist and clinical trial researcher Charles Warlow, ‘are 
exhausted by the demands of ethics committees that seem more concerned with 
the science (which they cannot necessarily judge) and editorial control of patient 
information sheets than with ethics’ (Warlow 2004: 241). I want to emphasize that 
this separation of science and ethics is not only a matter for committees in countries 
with fewer experts. It is a dilemma of expertise more broadly: the questions of a 
study’s sample size demand the presence of a statistician; uncertainty about new 
methods leaves members wondering what knowledge will arise from the study. Few 
committees have the expertise to address everything that arrives on their tables. 
But can, and should, committees be expected to act as what Jacobs calls ‘epistemic 
filters’ (Jacobs 2019)?
Dr Dipika’s story, with which I opened, takes us to the position of the research 
ethics committee poised between assessment and action, its relationship to (audit-
able) documentation and its temporal nature of anticipation.2 Her initiative reminds 
us that committees are not present when research is being conducted, and few have 
the resources to do ‘follow up’ work. But it also reminds us that committees are 
collectives. Their assessment is not the view of a single expert, moving out into the 
field to observe. Their assessment, as I shall go on to argue, falls within the complex 
domain inhabited by other nongovernmental actors, whose witnessing is tied to 
institutional, professional and ethical subjectivities. Let me introduce the character 
of their assessment by returning to my ethnography.
Collective vision 
A plastic water bottle was the device used to introduce me to how a committee sees. 
I encountered this water bottle at Thammasat University, Bangkok, on a hot April 
day in 2010. Through the lunch break of a training course, over piles of lychees 
and rambutan, I spent time quizzing my patient interlocutors, Juntra and Cristina, 
about the topic that had for some time been my empirical focus: decisions in ethics 
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review committee meetings. Deep into our dialogue about the kinds of expertise 
that committees often convened, Juntra declared with conviction something I 
found rather surprising. Committee members should, she said, avoid the kind of 
discussions which led to position taking:
In a debate, if you adopt a position, you take that and see if you win or lose at the 
end. You won’t compromise. But it’s not about winning or losing, that’s not a good 
attitude for an ethics committee.
Cristina agreed:
It’s not who you are, [if you take a position] you won’t be moved, so it’s not what you 
really think. Real life is about decisions, not hypothetical unreal stories. If, instead, 
all of you have one position, how to contribute to the protocol – if you have that 
position, you can have your eyes open for another’s view.
Juntra, who was sitting opposite me, pointed to the water bottle between us to 
illustrate the point. ‘I can’t see the other side of the bottle,’ she said. ‘Our job, is to 
ask, “How can we describe the whole bottle?”’
Now, it seems like Juntra and Cristina are asking for different things. They 
don’t want committee members to take ‘a position’, seen as something that makes 
members unable to compromise. But they do want everyone to have a single 
purpose: to contribute to the protocol. This, Cristina suggests, can make the view 
of others available. In her demonstration, Juntra intends the bottle between us as 
the applicant’s protocol, forcing the bottle into view not only from the literal per-
spectives of those around a table at an ethics committee meeting, but also their 
figurative perspectives. That she and I can literally see different sides of the bottle 
is equated with the different (figurative) ‘perspectives’ that the members on the 
committee will bring to the discussion: they may have clinical experience; they 
may have knowledge of the law. The ideal discussion of an ethics committee, at least 
according to this lunchtime lesson, is able to describe the whole bottle – the whole 
protocol – and what it looks like ‘seen from all sides’. This curious imagined view 
of the protocol is one which finds resonance with ‘a kind of cubist presentation in 
which every side of the object is presented simultaneously to us in a single – though 
“general” – perspective’ (Holbraad and Willerslev 2007: 334). Turned into a ‘general’ 
perspective, the committee’s discussion finds its eventual resting form in a docu-
mented decision. Yet it is also an aggregative logic that wants to both clock up the 
geometric angles of a circle in search of a view from ‘everywhere’, to ‘allow people 
to participate in loose and temporary formations that can be done and undone 
according to different political, affective or epistemic affinities’, as Andrea Ballestero 
has put it (2017: 34). It wants the single view eventually produced to be a synthesis 
by virtue of each member removing themselves from their own perspective to take 
on the same task: ‘how to contribute to the protocol’. 
What kind of seeing is going on here? Seeing, as we know from countless 
histories of science and ethnographies of making-visible, is a tricky thing (Coop-
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mans et al. 2014; Strathern 2014). From optics to the scientific persona, it is often 
technologized, individualized and moralized (Daston and Galison 1992), tied 
to the personhood and ambition of a researcher. Yet for all the analyses that we 
have of vision and gaze, few have asked how a collective sees. Redfield’s analysis 
of Médicins Sans Frontières, the humanitarian organization known in English as 
Doctors Without Borders (2006), does so by centring on their evolving tradition of 
‘temoiniage’, arguing that as an NGO, with specific forms of medical expertise, they 
offer a ‘collective, expert witness to disaster, detailing as extensively and precisely as 
possible the anguish of the world’ (2006: 19, emphasis added). Like Redfield, I am 
working in a space of nongovernmental organizations, and with a field that often 
explicitly addresses questions of inequality, justice and the alleviation of suffering. 
Unlike Redfield, the collectivities I am ultimately discussing are not organizations 
or individuals, policies or modes of speech, but specific, standing groupings of 
around eight to ten people. They are committees. I agree with his insistence on 
‘recognising the collective nature and technical capacity of contemporary moral 
agents’ (2006: 5): these are groups of experts, whose authority rests on their collec-
tive character (Lamont and Huutoniemi 2011). To ask how a committee gains its 
capacity to see, we must ask what techniques of the visual make up its eyes. Based 
on Juntra and Cristina’s lunchtime lesson, my initial argument is that a visual logic 
of seeing from ‘all sides’ underpins the committee’s imagined vision, and thereby 
its legitimacy. This notion of seeing from all sides puts the committee’s assessment 
into a history of objectivity in which an objective gaze is moralized. What Juntra 
and Cristina are asking for is a uniquely disciplined expert, present for their exper-
tise, who is actively ensuring that their individual view is open to being informed 
through discussion. To witness, here, is not merely to see the proposal. It is to see it 
in a certain way, and to produce – through the social technology of the committee – 
a document with a decision. This is what Redfield calls a ‘representational persona, 
one that can function as a credible advocate of particular truth claims’ rights’ 
(2006: 5). The claims of such a person in his work emerge within a ‘larger system of 
global media and a legal discourse of human rights’ (Redfield 2006: 5), whereas the 
‘larger systems’ of ethics review concern the protection of human subjects that will 
participate in research. The ethics assessment takes place in a space of anticipation. 
Thus, the nature of the knowledge they produce is suspended – the viewpoints that 
went into making a decision are obscured – and it is not always possible to discern 
from a decision where it might be contested. 
Witnessing in secret
While histories of ethics committees root their activity narratively in the evalua-
tion of research on behalf of publics and in the interests of participants, they are 
nonetheless known for their closed proceedings. It is not at all easy to find out 
what they see, or how they do their work. Committees are closed to the point that, 
observing from their country of origin the United States, Laura Stark’s ethnogra-
phy of three committees and their deliberations took the title Behind Closed Doors 
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(2012). As ethics committees have been founded and run elsewhere in the world, 
this characteristic has led to questions being asked more openly about their oper-
ation and constitution. A 2009 editorial by the ethics expert Amar Jesani3 in the 
Indian Journal of Medical Ethics criticized the ‘silence’ on the operation of ethics 
committees. ‘Why is it’, he asked,
that even 30 years after ECs were first established in India, we do not have even 
experiential accounts (let alone systematic studies) on ECs in the public domain? 
Why have EC members not narrated the challenges and dilemmas they have faced, 
and discussed how to make regulations effective? (2009: 2)
With Jesani, we might ask why a process ostensibly designed to provide public 
reassurance that biomedical research is ethically sound is so closed to scrutiny? One 
answer is that in the biomedical industry, revealing research intentions before they 
become reality is a competitive disadvantage to which few would consent. Another 
is that if present, observers would influence the capacity of members to speak freely, 
and critically, about the proposals on the table in front of them. The translation of 
visual culture into the committee here is the argument that to do its work, the com-
mittee must itself be unobserved. Its independence and its capacity to speak to itself 
is dependent on its work behind closed doors. The anticipated gaze is not merely a 
gaze of knowledge (as for Juntra and Cristina above); it is, as the political scientist 
Yaron Ezrahi puts it, a gaze that shapes action (Ezrahi 1990: 101). Jesani is clearly 
interested in establishing systematic and nationwide knowledge across India about 
the work ethics committees do. But the question underlying his appeal is this: how 
can ethics work be socially accepted as a form of witnessing to good science, if that 
act cannot itself be witnessed? Ezrahi’s reference to the expected effect of the gaze 
upon conduct has direct implications on the effect of witnessing on the witnessed: 
to witness the witnessers would make their work of witnessing impossible. 
As Shapin and Schaffer note in their classic history of the Enlightenment 
foundations of modern science, Leviathan and the Air Pump, ‘democratic ideals 
and the exigencies of professional expertise form an unstable compound’ ([1985] 
2011: 336). Ethics review is the domain of professional expertise, but it also carries 
ideals of lay participation in the governance of science. Yet in the absence of the 
cornerstone of ‘transparency’ in committee practice, the role of public input gets 
into ethics deliberation in other ways. In his analysis of science and democratic 
reasoning, The Descent of Icarus, Ezrahi observes that scientific and political reason 
share visual languages. ‘The notion of politics as something observable,’ he writes, 
‘has come to uphold in America a conception of accountability which rests on the 
complementary requirements … that actions taken by political agents be made 
transparent to the public and that citizens act as competent witnesses and judges 
of the exercises of political power’ (Ezrahi 1990: 99). In my case, citizens are not 
called upon as witnesses of committee work. Indeed, their capacity to view the rea-
soning of the committee is limited. As we saw above, committee members cannot 
(ordinarily) be (individually) heard: their voices come together in the creation of a 
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collective vision. And meetings are closed. So, it is to committees themselves that 
the work of witnessing scientific proposals is put. But concern regarding silence of 
members produced through the committee’s collective speech is also interesting for 
from whom this question of openness comes. Witnessing and secrecy might seem 
antithetical, belonging to opposite ends of a perceived spectrum of transparency. 
Surely to witness goes beyond seeing, into the capacity to reveal? 
‘Martyr of the IRB’
The committee does its work of seeing in a protected space, a space that arguably 
offers members the capacity to speak freely. Needing this space, however, indi-
cates that members of an ethics committee are not, actually, expected to be fully 
 disinterested. In the process of a committee meeting, even if Juntra and Cristina’s 
ideal performance of decision-making-through-common-positionality is followed, 
people may and should disagree with one another. Although I have discussed the 
role of the scientific assessment the committee must often make, their collective role 
is to speak for the research, and for the communities in which it will be conducted. 
Following FERCAP’s work across their region of operation led me to a large hos-
pital on the west coast of Taiwan. Here, in 2010, I sat down with Camilla for lunch. 
Camilla, a colleague of my local host, had just arrived back on campus from a nearby 
hospital where she had given a talk to doctors about the ethics of genetic research. 
‘I went to threaten them!’ she said, laughing, as we ate food from the nearby canteen. 
She wanted to make her classroom of researchers more aware of questions of privacy 
and the relevant regulations in Taiwan. ‘I can’t tell how much they change[d],’ she 
told me, ‘but gradually, I think they change their thinking of ethics’:
Medical doctors, they think of research; [the] patient, who cares? A lot of MDs, their 
mind is set on research but not really ethics. They might not think of it at all, before 
someone convinces them. Sometimes it is hard to change their attitude or thinking. 
Sometimes they still argue. It’s a long time process to educate these people. Even 
in a committee you find doctors still doing things very unethically – after all the 
education, I am always shocked that you still see these kinds of people around, still. 
I asked her to elaborate on ‘these kinds of people’. She shrugged, and told me she 
herself had once been one of them: ‘When initiating a research [project] we’d do 
unethical things, for consent – ignore things we were supposed to do. Just say “Hey, 
give me my proof – my IRB approval letter”. [Then] forget everything about ethical 
things’. As we talk, her criticism is initially aimed at researchers, as she speaks from 
her more recent role as an educator. But soon she begins to extend her critique to 
the committee she now sits on, suggesting that under pressure, committees bend 
to the expectations and demands of their colleagues:
The hierarchy system is very strong and people are afraid to lose their job. Commit-
tee is a nice way to do this, ’cos we have backup from each other. We can speak out. 
[We are] not afraid to have a ‘big mouth’.
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In my research conversations to that point, committee members had previously 
confided difficulties in speaking out or expressing concerns, but this was the first 
time someone had drawn explicitly on the committee as a collectivity (‘we have 
backup from each other’) as a way of establishing the authority of a committee 
against the authority of a (senior) researcher. The idea of a committee capable of 
making a critique from a position of common agreement seemed to tilt Camilla’s 
narrative of silenced voices in the face of steep institutional and professional hi-
erarchies. But after this outburst, Camilla fell silent. She reflected for a moment. 
And she changed her mind. Her account of the committee challenging authority 
through group discussion dissipated as she went on to reveal that it was in fact her 
enactment of this ideal of speaking out that led to her becoming an ex-member of 
the committee. ‘Well, actually I was kicked out!’ she exclaimed, with a wry smile.
They [the committee] want smoothly run, obedient ones. [For me] it’s about whether, 
at the right time, are you willing to speak up for something. Especially for ethics. 
You’re supposed to speak up. That’s our principle. It’s the right thing to do, for myself 
and participants. You set your mind on the ethical thing and you do it. Not differ-
ent to becom[ing] a martyr. I’m a martyr of the IRB! Honesty, integrity, things you 
believe in.
Camilla’s invocation of martyrdom reminds us of a different etymological route 
for the witness: martyr. Fassin, relying on Giorgio Agamben, points to the Greek 
translation of witness as martyros (Agamben 1999: 31, cited in Fassin 2008: 541), 
a connection noted too by Derrida, who tells us that ‘Greek makes no explicit 
reference to […] surviving, to presence’ (Derrida 2005: 75). The witness is the 
‘sacrificed person’, Fassin writes; ‘the sacrifice of his life bears witness’ (2008: 541). 
Now, Camilla does not give up her life, and certainly does not face the kind of death 
Fassin is describing in his article. But she leaves the committee rather than betray 
her idea of what ethics should be. She is, perhaps, a martyr to her ideals, but to her, 
it is her martyrdom that allows her to witness. In Fassin’s analysis, firmly in the 
realm of physical over, say, social death, ‘the martyr bears witness without speaking’ 
(2008: 541). We might see that Camilla’s insistence, her immovability, has shifted 
her from a position of expertise into one of ‘mere opinion’, removing her from a 
factual style into what Haraway, in her analysis of the immodest witness, has termed 
the ‘flourishes of a human author’ (1997: 26). She sees herself as bearing witness 
to ethics by remaining true to her ideals; she is seen by the committee as having 
diverged from the necessary capacity to bear witness as a part of a collective. Was 
Camilla ‘immodest’, and for whom?
Assembling attestation
In this final section, I build on my discussions above to suggest that the personal 
function of the witness becomes the attestive work of the group. As I noted earlier, 
a committee can seem poised between assessment and action. As many who have 
submitted proposals to their own university or hospital committees know, this 
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moment of suspension resolves at the end of their review process, when a committee 
provides a stamped document. This document can then be used by the researcher 
to assure funding bodies and journals that a review has taken place. In this shift 
from discussion to document, often effected in practice by the committee’s chair 
and secretary, ethics becomes something that can be obtained and proven through 
stamps and certificates (Jacob and Riles 2007). Analytically, I suggest that the doc-
ument generated untethers the committee’s work from its series of points of view 
and mobilizes an attestive assemblage into the voice of the committee, which then, 
as one lecturer put it during fieldwork, ‘speaks as one’ (2011: 235). By choosing to 
think of committee documentation as attestation (over testimony or witnessing), I 
am pointing to the non-narrative nature of the document, its ‘thingness’.4 However, 
unlike the ‘modest witness’ of the gentleman scientist variety (Shapin 1994), this 
collective entity does not simply retire from view. Remaining in view as a committee, 
in the absence of access to their deliberations, membership becomes the primary 
means by which those not party to discussions assess how well a ‘disinterest that 
is not dislocated’ (Redfield 2006: 17) has been achieved. The legitimate attestation 
rests on who has looked at the proposal. An example will illustrate.
During the Shanghai FERCAP conference where Dr Dipika presented, the 
conference members also spent a full afternoon in the large, darkened audito-
rium discussing language on the soon-to-be revised World Health Organization 
guidelines for research ethics committees (WHO 2011). Among many points of 
contention was a sentence regarding specifications of membership. Should the new 
guidelines specify that members should ‘represent’ the communities where research 
will be conducted? Is it sufficient to specify that they ‘reflect’ those communities? 
Or must they have ‘knowledge of ’ them? A committee is at a (careful) remove from 
those with whom proposed research will be conducted. This distance is managed 
through the composition of the committee. Having someone knowledgeable of the 
law is deemed necessary, and persons with knowledge of the communities in which 
the research will take place are seen as central to legitimate and informed decisions. 
Yet during discussions of what language to use in international guidelines, com-
mittee members at the conference in Shanghai go back and forth for hours. Was 
representation ‘too political’? Was ‘having knowledge of ’ too distant? What did 
‘reflection’ even mean?
From the United States, Stark describes how ‘administrative documents force 
people to identify as a given type’, something she calls a ‘constitutive perspective’, 
from the ways that formal records help constitute new types of people (Stark 2011: 
237). This ‘constitutive perspective’ has certainly entered international recommen-
dation documents, which specify the types of person a committee ought to contain. 
It is also visible in the discussions between representing and reflecting populations 
with whom research will take place. At stake is what members of committees know, 
and how they know it. Yet within this article’s argument that what members are 
doing is witnessing work, there is something further occurring in the discussion 
over terminology. These shifts in vocabulary between representation, reflection and 
‘having knowledge’ echo a divide in the root of witnessing, something that Fassin 
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has elaborated as a distinction between the knowledge of the observer and the 
participant. As Deborah Reed-Danahay summarizes, this separates those who give 
an account ‘on the basis of his observation, the other on the basis of his experience’ 
(Fassin 2011: 204, cited in Reed-Danahay 2017: 62). As committee members debate 
the distinction between ‘representation’, ‘reflection’ and ‘knowledge of ’ prospective 
research populations, at stake is the question of whose knowledge need go into 
the eventual assessment. Must members have experienced life in the way likely 
participants will? Or is it sufficient that they ‘have knowledge’ of it? Much as this 
is a discussion of ‘constitutive perspectives’, it is also a debate over what will count 
as the correct combination of observers and participants on a committee. When 
the product of a discussion is documentation, committee composition becomes 
the referent for that document’s capacity to fulfil its attestive role. Declaring the 
proposed research ‘approved’, the committee enacts its role as pre-emptive witness 
of both scientific and ethical concerns.
Conclusion
As ethics committees have been set up across the world, their members today par-
ticipate in a now global regime of knowledge making, approving both study designs 
and ethical considerations of prospective research. In the passages above, I have 
shown why committee work belongs in a genealogy of knowledge making that 
can be productively understood through the lens of witnessing: it is anticipatory, 
it depends on ideals of disinterested yet motivated vision, and it has the power to 
generate a collective voice through which to speak. 
Returning to my opening story, when Dr Dipika proposed that commit-
tee members enter the rooms and laboratories of researchers she was met with 
widespread dismay: not that kind of witnessing! Her suggestion to relocate the 
practices of committee witnessing made visible that the attestive work of committee 
members happens before research takes place – in the committee meeting. In this 
meeting, following Juntra and Cristina’s own theorization of a committee’s capacity 
for collective vision, we learn where a committee member should ‘stand’ during 
discussions. This key gives us access to committee work as an attestive assemblage, 
untethered from the model of an individual point of view or subject position. Re-
leased and reconstituted, the committee speaks a voice that obscures the specificities 
of the voices that underpin its legitimacy. Whereas the witnesses of early science 
benefited from the protections of rank, class and gender, the anticipatory witnesses 
of an ethics committee operate under the conditions of partial obscurity. Thus, the 
committee generates an authoritative assessment, the product of combined but con-
cealed expertise, a ‘mirror of reality that reinforces its own un-motivated veracity 
even as it transmits a distinctly moral framing vision’ (Redfield 2006: 17). Placing 
the committee as witness within longer traditions of scientific witnessing, we can 
see afresh the logics of vision that come to constitute its view.
The eventual documents that committee members author allow the prospective 
future contained in a research protocol to move ahead. By considering their bureau-
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cratic work as bearing witness to what ‘good’ science will be – both scientifically, in 
terms more familiar to historians of science, and ethically, as their name suggests – I 
bring the tacit logics of vision and voice back into view as constitutive of approval 
processes. Thus, research futures – as they pass over the tables of ethics commit-
tees – emerge through the ideal that committee work will indeed be witnessing 
work; that it will be ethical work, for ethical ends.
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Notes
 1. I shared a version of this vignette in an earlier publication (Douglas-Jones 2012). Since the online 
journal is no longer available, I have reformulated the ethnography for inclusion here. 
 2. FERCAP’s work has been particularly concerned with the kind of issues that the TRUST Code 
of Conduct (2018) aims to address, but over the past decade they have also seen a growth in 
collaborations between countries within the region.
 3. Amar Jesani, in addition to being a prominent and experienced public and community health 
worker, also serves on the international research ethics committee of Médicins Sans Frontières 
(MSF 2019).
 4. I am aware of Paul Ricoeur’s development of the concept of attestation and its conceptual relation-
ship to testimony (Griesch 1995), but do not develop it here.
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